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CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-DnTY OF PEDESTRIAN TO LooK WHILB
CROSSING OOERSECTION WITH LIGHT-The plaintiff was crossing a busy intersection in reliance on a green traffic light in his favor when he was struck by
defendant's automobile. Testifying in his own behalf, plaintiff said that he
waited until the light changed to green and traffic on both sides stopped before
proceeding to cross the street. He further stated that he was hit just before
reaching the other side of the street. He did not see defendant's automobile
before it struck him. At the conclusion of this testimony defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show freedom
from contributory negligence. The trial court granted the motion as there was
no testimony that plaintiff made continual observations after he started to
cross. The circuit court, on appeal, reversed and remanded for a new trial: the
uncontradicted testimony showed plaintiff was crossing on the green light and
hence a prima facie case was made. On appeal, the circuit court was affirmed
by an equally divided court. A pedestrian starting to cross when the light
has turned green cannot be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law
for failure to observe approaching traffic. The justices voting for reversal
thought that the plaintiff, in failing to make further observations of the light
and traffic after starting to cross the street, did not exercise due care for his
own safety and hence was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Ortisi v.
Oderfer, 341 Mich. 254, 67 N. W. (2d) 153 (1954).
It is a well established rule that a person in crossing a street or highway
must exercise that degree of care and caution which a reasonable man would
exercise under similar circumstances.1 In crossing an intersection with a

1 Morse v. Bishop, 329 Mich. 488, 45 N.W. (2d) 367 (1951); Pecora v. Marique,
273 App. Div. 705, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 350 (1948); Cheatwood v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co., 179 Va. 54, 18 S.E. (2d) 301 (1942); 79 A.L.R. 1073 (1932).
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favorable signal, the vast majority of jurisdictions do not as a matter of law
require a pedestrian to make a continual observation of the light and traffic.2
Although a pedestrian crossing a street with a green light has no absolute right
of way, he is entitled to presume that automobiles on the intersecting street
will obey the unfavorable light.3 The majority of courts hold that although
this preferential right of way does not excuse the pedestrian's duty of reasonable
care, it does make the question of whether he exercised such care in failing
to maintain a lookout for approaching traffic one for the trier of facts. 4 In
contrast, a few states have adopted the badly reasoned view, long adhered to
by Michigan, that reasonable care requires that a pedestrian make constant
observations in almost all directions while crossing a street, with or without a
favorable light, under the penalty that a failure to do so will constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. 5 As suggested by the affirming opinion
of the principal case, the effect of the minority doctrine is to afford a pedestrian
no protection from the green light since his duties of observation are the same
with or withotJt it. 6 The majority doctrine requires only that a pedestrian
look at such times as will give him reasonable knowledge of approaching traffic.7
Hence, having looked when he started to cross, a pedestrian is not generally
bound as a matter of law to look again. 8 This would especially hold true when,
as in the principal case, the pedestrian started to cross when the light turned
green. Ordinarily he should have the right to presume that traffic lights are
adjusted so that he may safely cross the street.9 Still, even under the majority
doctrine there are those instances where the circumstances and conditions would
clearly indicate that the failure of the pedestrian to make any observation is
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 10 The tendency of cases where the
2 Sandefer v. Robins, 35 Ala. App. 393, 48 S. (2d) 540 (1950); Young v. Tassop,
47 Cal. App. (2d) 557, ll8 P. (2d) 371 (1941); Butts v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 165
Kan. 477, 195 P. (2d) 567 (1948); Grass v. Ake, 154 Ohio St. 84, 93 N.E. (2d) 590
(1950); 2A BLAsHFIELD, CYc. AuTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, perm. ed., §1472
(1951); 10 id. §6628, n. 21.5, 22 (1942).
3 Petersen v. General Rug & Carpet Cleaners, 333 lli. App. 47, 77 N.E. (2d) 58
(1947); Wisnaski v. Afman, 341 Mich. 453, 67 N.W. (2d) 731 (1954); Horwitz v.
Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E. 644 (1934).
4 Hendricks v. Pappas, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 774, 187 P. (2d) 436 (1947); Evans v.
Dickinson, 127 Conn. 297, 16 A. (2d) 582 (1940); Bishop v. Huffman, 175 Kan. 270,
262 P. (2d) 948 (1953); 164 A.L.R. 8 at 234 (1946).
5 Sloan v. Ambrose, 300 Mich. 188, 1 N.W. (2d) 505 (1942); Boyd v. Maruski, 321
Mich. 71, 32 N.W. (2d) 53 (1948); Rucheski v. Wisswesser, 355 Pa. 400, 50 A. (2d)
291 (1947); Dwyer v. Kellerman, 363 Pa. 593, 70 A. (2d) 313 (1950); 2A BLAsHFIELD,
CYc. AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, perm. ed., §1472 (1951).
6 Principal case at 259.
1 Cummings v. Whitney, (2d Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 354; Duchaine v. Ray, llO
Vt. 313, 6 A. (2d) 28 (1939).
s Chevalley v. Degar, (Ohio App. 1943) 52 N.E. (2d) 544; Farrow v. Ostrom, IO
Wash. (2d) 666, 117 P. (2d) 963 (1941).
9 Principal case at 262.
10 Robb v. Pike, ll9 Fla. 833, 161 S. 732 (1935) (deliberately walking in front of
approaching car); Moseley v. Mills, 145 Wash. 253, 259 P. 715 (1927) (aware of
approaching car but failing to look). " .•. where the danger is obvious =d apparent being
directly in the path of the pedestrian, and where the pedestrian is no longer entitled to
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pedestrian is crossing with the signal is to limit the duty of lookout to the discovery of obvious perils from vehicles.11 The rationale of the majority is apparently
founded on the reasoning that a pedestrian who crosses in reliance on a favorable
light is bound to center at least a part of his attention upon the condition of
the pavement, other pedestrians crossing the street, and upon the traffic signal
itself in order to be aware of any changes therein.12 Other Michigan cases
have recognized that a pedestrian has a right to assume that approaching automobiles will not violate the law.13 Clearly the affirming opinion does not ask
that a pedestrian crossing with the light be fully relieved from a duty of
exercising reasonable care, but only that the light afford such protection as
will free him from the absolute and invariable duty of constant observation.
Although the principal case followed the majority doctrine by an equally divided
court, it may well be interpreted as indicating a possible retraction in Michigan
of the antiquated and unrealistic minority doctrine.
Harvey A. Howard, S.Ed.

the benefit of the light because it has changed • • • the plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failure to observe." Principal case at 258.
11 Riddel v. Lyon, 124 Wash. 146, 213 P. 487 (1923); Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co.,
20 Wash. (2d) 67, 145 P. (2d) 1019 (1944).
12 Goodman v. Brown, 164 Misc. 145, 298 N.Y.S. 574 (1937); 164 A.L.R. 8 at 59
(1946).
13Travis v. Eisenlord, 256 Mich. 264, 239 N.W. 304 (1931); Douglas v. Holcomb,
340 Mich. 43, 64 N.W. (2d) 656 (1954).

